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Individual agricultural producers in the short run are “price takers” rather than “price makers,” with 
little control in the short run over the price they receive for their products (Kohls 1967).  Due to 
their numbers (many), relative size (small), the nature of their products (homogeneous with many 
substitutes), and lack of market power, they have little or no ability to influence the price they 
receive for their products, therefore, are usually unable to pass cost increases on to customers (USDA 
November 7, 2006).  Agricultural producers are unique in that they typically bear the transportation 
costs, not the grain elevator, when grain is transported (Kohls 1967).  Consequently, increases in 
transportation costs result in decreased producer profit (Montana Wheat & Barley Committee et 
al. 2006).  For agricultural shippers with no cost-effective alternative to rail, and located far from 
markets, rail is the only viable transportation available and the rail rate determines the net price the 
producer receives (USDA November 2, 2006).  
Lower prices and incomes hinder farmers from borrowing funds to purchase fertilizer, seed, and 
machinery, reducing economic prosperity in rural areas.  Higher transportation costs also affect the 
competitive position of U.S. agricultural products in highly competitive export markets.  The rates 
agricultural shippers pay for rail transportation can facilitate or inhibit American competitiveness in 
world agricultural markets (USDA November 2, 2006).
The costs of rail transportation to market represent a significant percentage of the average on-
farm price because grain and oilseeds are bulk commodities with a low value in proportion to their 
weight (Figure 1).  For example, average rail tariff rates as a percent of the farm price of wheat have 
varied from 11.3% in 2007, when wheat prices were high, to 23.1% in 1999, when wheat prices 
were low.  Rail transportation costs for individual movements of agricultural products have been as 
much as 40% of the delivered price (USDA 2005).
Despite these concerns, rates for land transportation of agricultural commodities in the United 
States remain among the lowest in the world.  Although rail rates for agricultural commodities have 
not fallen as much as rates for some other products (such as coal) (GAO 2006), Figure 1 shows that 
the rail transportation cost during 2007, as a percentage of the price of a bushel of wheat, was at a 
14-year low.  
This paper evaluates changes in agricultural rail rates relative to shipment size and distance shipped 
to understand how they affect agricultural shippers. Since the Staggers Act, railroads have transferred 
costs to agricultural shippers and over-recovered fuel costs with surcharges. Captive agricultural 
shippers question the reasonableness of rail rates in light of railroad revenue adequacy data.
Rail Rate and Revenue Changes 
Since the Staggers Act
Rail Rate and Revenue Changes
56
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For nearly 100 years, the performance of railroads reflected the constraints put on them by federal 
regulation. The Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1887 (ICC Act) created the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC). The ICC implemented the provisions of the ICC Act, working for 
“just and reasonable” rates without price discrimination.  The regulatory environment created by the 
ICC Act and subsequent statutes required railroads to employ cost-of-service pricing and to price at 
average cost, with some variation usually allowed by commodity and length of haul.   
Pervasive regulation interfered with the ability of railroads to react to competitive situations 
and efficiently manage their firms.  Rate adjustments were slow, innovations were stymied, and 
rationalization of rail infrastructure was expensive and time-consuming (Gallamore 1999).  The 
unwieldy regulatory framework, along with increased competition from other modes—in part due 
to government promotion of competing transportation modes—led to a loss of market share of 
intercity freight and the attendant revenue (GAO 1990). The railroads were unable to maintain their 
infrastructure, were close to bankruptcy, and were not competitive.
Regulatory reform happened slowly. The most important legislation was the Staggers Act 
of 1980. Railroads seized on their new regulatory freedom to actively pursue profits and return 
on investment using differential pricing, cost efficiencies, abandonment of un-remunerative rail 
lines, mergers with other railroads, and the rate innovations of contracts and multiple-car pricing 
(Gallamore 1999).  
Railroads have also successfully controlled and reduced costs by abandoning rail lines, 
creating short line railroads, reducing labor in operations and administration, making longer hauls, 
increasing traffic density on rail lines, and using new technologies imaginatively (Gallamore 1999, 
Prater and Klindworth 2000).  Increasing shipment and car sizes, running directionally,1 and sharing 








































































































Average rail tariff rate per bushel
National average price of all wheat
Figure 1: Wheat–Average Rail Tariff Compared to Average Farm Price*
*Marketing year ending May 31.
Sources: STB Confidential Waybill  Sample
 USDA, NASS, Crop Value Summary
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Railroads adopted differential pricing to use their capacity efficiently and recover their high 
fixed and common costs.  If a railroad charged the same prices to all shippers, some shippers would 
find it more profitable to ship by another mode.  As these shippers withdrew, the railroad would have 
to raise prices on its remaining customers to cover its fixed costs.  Differential pricing also gives 
railroads the flexibility to react to differences in modal competition (Prater and Klindworth 2000).
Consequently, the variable cost of providing rail transportation serves only as a floor below 
which rates should not go and bears little relationship to individual rail rates.  Instead, rail rates are 
based on the price and service characteristics of competing transportation modes, the railroad’s own 
price and service characteristics, and the railroad’s cost.
With differential pricing, shippers are charged different rates for the same service based on the 
shipper’s dependence upon rail service. Differential pricing results in unequal rates and revenue-to-
variable cost ratios for different commodities, geographical locations, and producers, even in similar 
circumstances. Consequently, with differential pricing, captive shippers bear a higher proportion of 
a railroad’s fixed and common costs than non-captive shippers (Prater and Klindworth 2000).
The Staggers Act relies on competition to limit rail rates, but includes rate appeal procedures 
to limit the rates railroads could charge captive shippers (who have no competitive transportation 
choice).  A shipper must meet three conditions to appeal rail rates (USDA and USDOT 2010):
•	 Shippers may appeal only tariff rates.2  The STB has no jurisdiction over contract rates 
and rates for exempt movements.3
•	 The movement must have a revenue-to-variable cost ratio that exceeds 180%.
•	 The shipper must show that the railroad has market dominance, which is the lack of 
effective intermodal and rail-to-rail competition.
In the early years of deregulation, intramodal competition may have been sufficient to yield a 
competitive rail grain rate structure.  However, rail mergers and line abandonments have reduced 
intramodal competition considerably, resulting in an oligopolistic market structure that may allow 
railroads considerably more pricing freedom.
Thus, although differential pricing offers shippers the benefit of having viable and stable 
rail service, reaction to rail deregulation from shippers has not been all positive.  Shippers feel 
responsiveness to shipper needs has been lost, rail costs have been shifted to the shipper, overall rail 
service and capacity have decreased, rates are generally increasing, and rates have been “unfair and 
inequitable” in some corridors and for some commodities.  Such shippers often charge that railroads 
unreasonably raise their rates to levels that are far beyond those that should be charged (Montana 
Wheat & Barley Committee et al. 2005; NGFA 2005; USDA 2005).
Numerous papers (cited below) discuss railroad industry competition and pricing, providing 
varying degrees of analysis as to the impact of competition within the industry.  Many of these 
papers are regional in scope, investigate the impact of deregulation after the Staggers Rail Act of 
1980, and the majority were written in the decade after enactment.  The following is not a complete 
survey of the prior research related to railroad competition, but instead emphasizes the interaction 
between railroad competition and rail grain transportation prices.
Babcock, Sorenson, Chow, and Klindworth (1985) investigated the impact of the Staggers Act 
on Kansas agriculture. The study found substantial railroad rate reductions in the four-year period 
of 1981 through 1984. The pattern of rate changes suggested the presence of both intramodal and 
intermodal transportation competition.  Tariff rates to the Gulf of Mexico during this period dropped 
34% compared with a 64% increase in the four years preceding the Staggers Act.
MacDonald (1987) used regression analysis of the 1983 waybill sample data to examine the 
rail rates for corn, wheat, and soybeans.  Rates were negatively related to tonnage, distance, and 
volume of the shipments.  Also, rates were negatively related to increased intramodal competition 
(the reciprocal of the Herfindahl Index) and rail rates increased with distance to waterways.
A later study (MacDonald 1989) uses waybill data from 1981 through 1985 to analyze rail rates 
and competition for corn, wheat, and soybeans.  MacDonald found that when rail service goes from 
a monopoly to a duopoly, rail rates decline 18%.  The addition of a third competing railroad resulted 
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in an additional 11% decrease in rail rates.  Also, he found that shippers located 400 miles from barge 
access paid rail rates that were 40% higher than those located 100 miles from barge access.  Finally, 
MacDonald calculated inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for each crop reporting district (CRD) 
and concluded that each CRD was characterized by rail oligopolies.
Chow (1986) studied post-Staggers rail grain rates for the Central Plains region.  His analysis 
indicated an overall reduction in wheat rail rates of 34.5% in the five-year period after enactment of 
the Staggers Act, with the most significant reductions occurring in movements to the export markets.
Kwon, Babcock, and Sorenson (1994) examined the impacts of the Staggers Act in the latter 
half of the 1980s and found that railroads practiced differential pricing for intra Kansas and export 
shipments of wheat.  They discovered substantial differences in the factors affecting the revenue-
to-variable cost ratios for intra Kansas wheat movements versus that of Kansas export wheat 
movements.  Revenue-to-variable cost ratios increased steadily from 1986 through 1989, but this 
could have been caused by diminishing export demand.
Fuller, Bessler, MacDonald, and Wohlgenant (1987) found deregulation to have had a significant 
effect on rail corridors linking Kansas and Texas with Gulf ports and a relatively modest effect on 
the corridor linking Indiana with East Coast ports.  Real rail rates declined $.37 per bushel in the 
Kansas corridor and $.31 per bushel in the Texas corridor during the 1981-1985 period.  In the 
Indiana corridor, real rail rates were estimated to decrease $.08 per bushel.  Railroad deregulation 
had little statistically significant effects on real rail rates from Iowa and Illinois to the Gulf ports.
Koo, Tolliver, and Bitzan (1993) examined railroad pricing behavior in North Dakota, which 
is often considered a captive railroad shipping market. The region has unique transportation 
characteristics that include limited intermodal competition due to great distances to barge-loading 
facilities and to major domestic and export markets.  They found that distance, volume, weight per 
car, intramodal competition, and intermodal competition had significant negative effects on rail 
rates. 
Thompson, Hauser, and Coughlin (1990) evaluated the pre- and post-Staggers effect of 
competition on railroad revenue-to-variable cost ratios for export shipments of corn and wheat.  The 
regression results for corn were less significant than those of wheat.  There was a lack of identifiable 
differences in pre- and post-Staggers pricing, which may be attributable to the close correlation 
between changes in operating factors, such as shipment size, and destination opportunity.  They 
concluded that their results did not indicate a clear effect of the Staggers Rail Act on rail rate 
competitiveness.
Wilson and Wilson (2001) examined rail rates for barley, corn, sorghum, wheat, and soybeans 
moved by rail.  The explanatory variables include commodity ton-miles, commodity prices, average 
length of haul, and a non-linear specification of deregulation that allows the effects to phase in over 
time. They found that commodity prices have positive effects on rail rates and length of haul has a 
strong negative effect. The results indicate a large negative effect on rates from deregulation, which 
dissipate with time.
The STB waybill rate data are used in Figure 2 to examine the real revenue per ton-mile for 
the period 1985 to 2007.  The STB uses the Tornqvist Index to track rail rates.  The Tornqvist index 
measures the change in prices in commodity categories and assigns a percentage weight to each 
category based on its share of total revenue.  The index is essentially the weighted average of price 
changes within the various commodity categories.  Both the prices within the various commodity 
categories and the weights assigned to each category can vary (STB 2009).
The downward pressure on rates identified above as a result of railroad efficiency improvements 
and competitive pricing is evident.  From 1985 to 2004 the rail rate index fell almost continuously, 
with only a slight increase being noted in 2002.  However, as frequently stated to the STB by 
shippers, the years since 2004 have seen rapidly increasing rates for shippers.  Starting in 1985, rail 
rates dropped about 10% in the first two years, continued dropping at nearly that rate through 1992, 
and then declined at a slower rate during the period between 1992 and 2000.  Over the next few 
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years, the rates hovered in a narrow range, varying both positively and negatively until 2004.  From 
2004 to 2007 the rate index increased nearly 15%, from 56.8 to 65.5 (STB 2009).
Various studies (GAO 1990, GAO 2006, Christensen 2008) have agreed with the findings that 
overall rail rates decreased substantially from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s. The causes of the 
decrease included: 
•	 The rationalization of the rail network, with abandonments and creations of short line or 
regional railroads decreasing costs while maintaining much of the original traffic. 
•	 The increase in trainload shipments.
•	 The shifts to larger-capacity rail cars and technology innovations.  
The recent STB study of railroad rates from 1985 to 2007 (2009) found that “inflation-adjusted 
rates” increased from 2005 to 2007. The STB wrote: “This represents a significant change from prior 
years, given that inflation-adjusted rail rates declined in every year but one from 1985 through 2004.” 
The STB further elaborated: “In fact, adjusting for the purchasing power of the dollar, shippers spent 
$7.8 billion more in 2007 than they would have if the rate levels of 2004 had remained in place.” 
The STB rate study (2009) further points out that well over half the increase in rail rates between 
2004 and 2007 could be attributed to higher fuel costs. Yet, even after consideration of fuel costs, 
railroad rates have been steadily increasing during the last few years (STB 2009). 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that the percentage of traffic in 
tons traveling at rates above a revenue-to-variable cost ratio (R/VC) of 300, which is substantially 
above the statutory jurisdiction level of 180, has generally increased from 1985 through 2005 (GAO 
2007).  The share of tonnage traveling at rates over 300% R/VC increased from 6.1% in 2004 to 
6.4% in 2005. 
This paper examines the R/VC for railroad grain and oilseed movements and railroad rates 
for grain and oilseed movements by shipment size and distance. Railroad fuel surcharges are also 
examined and found to exceed the growth in railroad fuel costs. Finally, railroad revenue adequacy 








































Figure 2: STB Rail Rate Index 1985 to 2007; Real Revenue Per Ton-Mile (1985=100)
Source: STB, Study of Railroad Rates: 1985-2007
Rail Rate and Revenue Changes
60
RECENT RAIL RATE LEVELS
This study calculated average R/VC ratios for grain and oilseed tariff rates by dividing the freight 
revenue field in the Confidential Waybill Sample by the variable cost field.  The variable costs are 
calculated for the waybill sample by the STB using its Uniform Rail Costing System. 
Figure 3 shows a slight downward trend from 1988 to 1998 in the percent of grain and oilseed 
tonnage traveling above an R/VC of 300%.  The increase in the percentage of tons moving at R/VC 
greater than 300% began in 1999 and peaked at 7.7% in 2002, then decreased to 2.8% in 2006 and to 
2.4% in 2007.  The vertical line in figures 3 and 4 denotes the lack of waybill data for 1992 and 1993.
In some states, however, a much greater percentage of grain and oilseed tonnage moves at R/VC 
ratios greater than 300% (Figure 4).  These states include Iowa, Montana, and North Dakota.  The 
high percentage of rail rates exceeding a R/VC of 300% for Montana shippers from 1998 through 
2004 could be due to its distance from intermodal competition and the fact that one railroad handles 
95% of the rail movements of grain.  However, rates and R/VC ratios for movements of agricultural 
commodities can differ from state to state for numerous reasons, and can change significantly from 
year to year as Figure 4 shows.  
The analysis of rail rates is limited to tariff rates since contract rates are confidential and 
unregulated.  However, several limitations in Waybill Sample data mean that tariff rates should 
be used with some caution. Volume discounts and rebates for use of non-railroad equipment are 
not included in tariff rates.  Fees for guaranteeing delivery of rail equipment on specific dates, or 
“certificates of transportation” payments, are not included.  Also, in some instances contract rates 
can differ substantially from tariff rates, while in other instances there can be little if any difference 
between contract and tariff rates.  Thus, the use of Waybill Sample tariff data and costs for the 
calculation of R/VC ratios can provide a misleading picture for some comparisons.  While these 
anomalies can distort the R/VC calculations for some comparisons, the results presented in the rate 
analysis for this study are thought to be generally representative of rate trends over the period.   
Agriculture Rates are Higher Than Those of Other Commodities
The GAO found that “although rates have declined since 1985, they have not done so uniformly, and 
rates for some commodities are significantly higher than rates for others” (GAO 2006) (Figure 5). 
Specifically, GAO found that “grain rates declined from 1985 through 1987, but then diverged from 
the other commodity trends and increased, resulting in a net 9% increase by 2004.”  In 2005, rates 
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Figure 3: Percent of Grain and Oilseed Tons Moved at Tarriff Rates with R/VC Greater 
 Than 300%
Source: USDA analysis of STB Waybill Sample
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for all commodities increased by 9% over 2004 rates, the largest annual increase in 20 years.  Rail 
rates for grain increased 8.5% over 2004 (GAO 2007).  
According to the AAR	Freight	Commodity	Statistics, agricultural rates not only are higher than 
those of other commodities, but also have increased more rapidly (see Figure 6).  For instance, rail 
rates for grain and oilseeds increased to $2,809 per carload in 2008, up 73% from 2003; rates for 
all other commodities increased to $1,556 per carload, up 50%.  In addition, grain and oilseed rates 
during 2008 were 81% higher than those paid by all other commodities, compared with 55% higher 
in 1998.  The average number of grain and oilseed tons per carload increased 2.2%, from 97.6 tons 
per carload in 1998 to 99.7 tons per carload in 2008.
Comparison of Rates by Shipment Size and Distance Shipped
The STB waybill sample allows specific analysis of grains and oilseeds, which is presented in detail 
in this section. This study did not have access to the unmasked confidential waybill data, which report 
the unmasked rail rates for contract movements as well as for tariff movements.  Consequently, only 
tariff rail rates are analyzed in this section.  In addition, samples with fewer than 30 observations are 
not included in the figures to increase the statistical reliability of the analysis.  The vertical lines in 
figures 7 and 8 denote the lack of waybill data for 1992 and 1993.
The rates for grain and oilseeds reflect a significant advantage for large trainload shipments. 
As can be seen in Figure 7, rates for all shipment sizes have risen steadily and rapidly since 2003. 
The rates for the smallest shipment size have increased 21% since 2003, compared with 25 and 
23%, respectively, for 6–49 car and 50+ car shipments, keeping the relative relationships between 
shipment size categories about the same over the last five years analyzed.  However, since 1988, 
the rates for the smallest shipment sizes have increased by only 13%, while the rates for 6–49 car 
shipments and 50+ car shipments have increased by 40% and 43%, respectively.  This shows that 
the rates for larger sized shipments have increased relatively more than for smaller shipments over 
the entire period.  
Rates for large shipments are nearly 2.1 cents per ton-mile, contrasted with about 3.0 cents for 
smaller movements.  Rates for large shipments are about one cent or 33% lower than the smallest 
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Source: USDA analysis of STB Waybill Sample
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Figure 5: Rate Changes for Coal, Grain, Mixed Shipments, and Motor Vehicles, 1985–2005
Source: GAO analysis of STB data





























All other commodities Grain and oilseeds
Grain and oilseeds up 73%; 2008 over 2003;
All other commodities up 50%; 2008 over 2003.
Figure 6: Railroad Average Freight, Revenue per Carload
Source: Association of American Railroads, Freight Commodity Statistics
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shipment size.  In 1988, though, large shipments were 46% less than small shipments.  The discount 
for medium-size shipments relative to small shipments has decreased substantially—from 23% in 
1988 to only 5% in 2007.
A similar situation holds for shorter distance movements, in which rates are consistently about 
double the rates for movements over 751 miles in length—4.6 cents versus 2.15 cents per ton-
mile in 2007.  Rates for short hauls started increasing in 2000, but longer hauls didn’t have sharp 





















































1-5 cars 6-49 cars 50+ cars
Figure 7: Grain and Oilseeds Tariff Revenue (Current $) Per Ton-mile by Shipment Size
Source: STB Waybill Samples
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Source: STB Waybill Samples
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This detailed examination of the grain and oilseeds commodity group shows the effect of 
distance on railroad rates.  As railroads seek to increase the usage and revenue generation of their 
rolling stock, it is often in their best interest to give price/rate incentives to shippers with long hauls. 
Also, the cost disadvantages in equipment utilization make the short hauls more expensive for the 
carriers.
It is widely acknowledged that railroads have used trainload or multiple car rates to encourage 
shippers to consolidate shipments, thereby increasing the efficiency of the capital stock, power, and 
labor.  The analyses above demonstrate that the longer the movement, the lower the rate charged by 
the railroads.  However, the analysis does not consider the costs that have been shifted to the shipper 
so they could access these rates.  
TRANSFER OF RAILROAD COSTS TO SHIPPERS
Rail rates have decreased since deregulation in the early 1980s.  Inflation-adjusted rates have 
decreased by slightly over 30% since 1985.  However, a broad and consistent increase in rail rates 
over at least the last four years—and for some commodities the last seven years—indicates the 
railroads have used rates to achieve profit levels previously unseen in the industry.  
Moreover, the overall decrease in revenue per ton-mile for railroads does not reflect the actual 
impact on shippers.  The logistical cost to shippers, and to the public, has increased over that time.  
The Christensen study defined cost-shifting as additional costs incurred by shippers as a 
result of changes in railroad operations. Examples of cost-shifting identified in that study include 
(Christensen 2008): 
•	 A shift in railcar ownership and its associated expenses, such as maintenance and 
insurance, from railroads to shippers or other private firms.   
•	 Increased railcar maintenance standards being required by railroads as necessary to 
maintain service and capacity. 
•	 Increases in and additions to accessorial charges, such as finance charges, charges for 
faxing versus electronic transmission, higher demurrage charges, private car storage 
charges, and car cleaning charges.
•	 Deterioration in railroad service, causing the increased use of shipper labor to monitor 
railroad performance or to unload railcars.
•	 The use of trucking to transport goods to distant terminals to access multiple-car rates.
•	 Increased highway congestion and maintenance because of the increased use of trucking.
The average rate per ton-mile has decreased, in part, because all shippers, and especially grain 
shippers, are assuming greater responsibility for car supply and other functions that railroads have 
traditionally provided.  Many shippers, in times of short railcar supply, use guaranteed rail-ordering 
systems, paying fees in addition to tariff rates to guarantee car delivery within a specified time 
period rather than risking a delay in receiving railcars on a first-come-first-served  basis (Prater and 
Klindworth 2000).   
The attractiveness of unit and shuttle trains due to the railroad’s rate structure has caused 
shippers to invest in sidings, inventory, storage capacity, and loading facilities to access these more 
cost-effective rail services.  Shippers note that, after investing in equipment to handle 50–54-rail-car 
shipments, the railroads have changed some rate structures to emphasize 100–110-car shipments, 
requiring further investments.
The costs of railcar ownership have shifted from railroads to shippers, adding further to costs 
not reflected in tariff rates. As can be seen in Figure 9, private ownership has been the source, in 
a steady increase, of new covered hopper railcar capacity.  In 1981, private ownership accounted 
for 41% of the total covered hopper cars, with the Class I railroads providing 56% and the smaller 
railroads contributing 3% of the capacity (AAR, Railroad	 Equipment	 Report 1982).  By 2008, 
hopper car ownership was 70% private, 26% Class I railroad, and 4% smaller railroads (AAR, 
Railroad	Equipment	Report 2008).  Another way of looking at rail car ownership is to see that from 
JTRF Volume 50 No. 1, Spring 2011
65
1981 to 2008 privately owned cars increased from 128,394 to 290,176, or 126%, as Class I railroads 
decreased their ownership by 37% (AAR, Railroad	Equipment	Report 1982-2008).  The costs of car 
ownership have been shifted to the shippers or their agents.    
Fuel Surcharges Versus Fuel Prices 
Rates per-ton-mile decreased from the time of deregulation until around 2002. Over the last four 
years these rates have significantly increased. Recently, railroad fuel charges have added to the 
shipper’s cost burden. These surcharges are designed to allow railroad firms to recover from shippers 
the impact on costs caused by abnormally high fuel prices.  Basic fuel charges have always been 
included in rail rate determination, but the recent spikes and variation in fuel prices caused railroads 
to search for ways of recapturing these costs in the near term.  
The fuel cost increases were first estimated as a percentage of tariff rates, but shippers felt 
any errors in estimation were on the side of the railroad carrier. As fuel prices and the attendant 
fuel surcharges were implemented, shippers felt that carriers were using these surcharges as profit 
centers, whether the fuel costs were going up or down. They also believed that rate-based fuel 
surcharges did not fairly apportion the additional cost of the fuel among shippers.  Subsequent to a 
regulatory proceeding on rail fuel surcharges, the STB (STB 2007) on January 25, 2007, ruled that: 
•	 Computing rail fuel surcharges as a percentage of a base rate is an unreasonable business 
practice because rail rates do not accurately reflect the additional cost of fuel used in 
individual movements. The STB reasoned that a rate-based fuel surcharge would result in 
shippers who pay higher rail rates also paying higher fuel surcharges. 
•	 The fact that a railroad may not be able to recover its increased fuel costs from some of 
its traffic does not provide a reasonable basis for shifting those costs onto other traffic.  
•	 Railroads are prohibited from “double dipping”—charging a fuel surcharge in addition to 
increasing rates using an index that includes fuel costs as a component.
•	 Railroads operating in the United States had until April 26, 2007, to change their fuel 
surcharge programs to comply with the STB ruling.  
When examining the performance of fuel surcharges in recovering fuel cost increases, wide 
differences among fuel surcharge rates cause concern about the accuracy of surcharge formulas. 
For instance, during September 2008, when surcharges peaked, they varied among railroads from 
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46.58 cents to 87 cents per car mile, a difference of nearly 87%.  The weighted average surcharge 
was 59 cents per car mile or $590 per car moving 1,000 miles.  
Shippers contend that fuel surcharges should reimburse railroads for only the incremental 
increase in fuel costs and not the base, since the base fuel costs are already in the rate. The average 
growth in fuel surcharge per grain carload during the 3rd quarter of 2008 was $650.77, contrasted to 
the growth in railroad fuel costs from 2001 until the 3rd quarter of 2008 of $286.46, a difference of 
127% over the incremental increase in the cost of fuel (see Figure 10).  
Figure 11 shows that the percentage by which the growth in grain fuel surcharges exceed the 
growth in railroad fuel costs since 2004 ranges from -30% to 163%. Note that the percentage growth 
in grain fuel surcharges exceeds the growth in railroad fuel costs in all but two quarters. Furthermore, 
as fuel costs increase, the difference between the quarterly growth in grain fuel surcharges and the 
growth in railroad fuel costs tends to increase. This correlation is not perfect mainly because fuel 
surcharges lag fuel cost increases by two months.
RAILROAD REVENUE ADEQUACY
An evaluation of railroad rate reasonableness requires consideration of both the relative profitability 
and costs of railroads.  Such an evaluation must also consider merger premiums4 and how they relate 







































































Growth in Grain Fuel Surcharges (since Qtr. 4, 2001)
Growth in Rail Fuel Costs (Since Qtr. 4, 2001)
Figure 10: Growth in Railroad Grain Fuel Surcharges v. Growth in Railroad Fuel 
     Costs by Quarter1
1 For the 7 Class I railroads operating in the United States. Weighted average fuel surcharges per carload 
were estimated by multiplying the average length of haul for grain by the quarterly weighted average fuel 
surcharge per carload mile. Weighted average fuel surcharge per carload mile prior to 2Q ’06 was estimated 
using mileage-based fuel surcharge formulas for individual railroads.
Source:  Class I Railroad quarterly filings to the Security and Exchange Commission.
 AAR, The Rail Transportation of Grain (2009).
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Merger Premiums and STB Revenue Adequacy
The STB annually measures the revenue earned from the rate structure against the adequacy of that 
revenue stream to infuse capital into the industry.  To determine the annual revenue adequacy, the 
carrier’s return on net investment (ROI) is compared with the rail industry’s after-tax cost of capital 
for that year.  If ROI is greater than the cost of capital, revenue is determined to be adequate.  
ROI is normally determined by dividing net income from railroad operations by the depreciated 
original cost, or book value, of the railroads’ assets.  This ROI is then compared with the railroad 
industry cost of capital.  The STB seeks to ensure that a railroad has the capability to invest in its 
infrastructure and provide a reasonable return to its investors.
The costs to be included in determining the critical ROI have been examined in various 
proceedings and shipper testimonies.  If the depreciated book value, or original cost, is increased, 
then calculated ROI decreases and revenue adequacy is negatively affected, allowing railroads to 
charge higher rates.  In addition, the STB’s Uniform Rail Costing System uses these higher cost 
values in the calculation of variable costs, thereby driving down the R/VC calculations for the 
railroad’s movements.
Shippers and shipper representatives have become concerned about the premiums being paid 
to newly formed railroads when a merger is granted.  The ICC/STB has been consistent in allowing 
such premiums, usually above the current stock or book price prior to the merger, to be included 
in the depreciated cost figure.  Shippers have argued that railroads should not be allowed to pay 
acquisition premiums if these costs are then used to decrease the railroad firm ROI, which is used 
for revenue adequacy determination.  This can result in the railroads being allowed to charge higher 
rates than would have been possible if the premiums had not been paid, resulting in economic 
impact and harm to the shippers.
The extent of these premiums is difficult to determine, but some information is available. 
Recent mergers have involved significant premiums paid by the merging railroads.  These estimated 
premiums range from $1.4 billion for the Union Pacific (UP) purchase of Chicago Northwestern 
in 1996 to $2.7 billion for the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe merger with Burlington Northern in 
1995, and $3.7 billion for UP’s purchase of Southern Pacific in 1996. Consultants estimate that the 
premium paid for Conrail by Norfolk Southern and CSX Transportation was about $6.9 billion. 
Other estimates also have been generated, but the relevant point is that these premiums, if added to 















































































Figure 11: Percentage Growth in Grain Fuel Surcharges Exceed Growth 
 in Railroad Fuel Costs
Source:  Class I Railroad quarterly filings to the Security and Exchange Commission.
 AAR, The Rail Transportation of Grain (2009).
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The railroad industry and the STB are the only industry and regulator that use book value for 
determining ROI and add merger premiums into the rate base.  For example, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission will not allow regulated entities to pass through to the customer acquisition 
or merger premiums unless the effect of the transaction has a net benefit (typically, a rate reduction) 
to the customers of the acquired entity.  The net result is that this approach discourages the payment 
of large premiums because they are not likely to be permitted to be passed through to customers.  
The net effect of merger premiums, which increase both variable and fixed costs of the railroads, 
is that some rates that would have been above 180% of variable costs might no longer meet that 
criterion and would no longer be subject to STB regulation.
A contrasting opinion on the ROI calculation is offered by the railroad industry and the 
AAR.  The railroads, through the AAR, have argued that the ROI calculation should be based not 
on depreciated value but on the replacement cost of the rail assets used to provide transportation. 
Merger premiums also could reflect the net present value of the merger in expected cost savings to 
the combined firm.
STB Measures of Rail Revenue Adequacy
Class I railroad revenue adequacy is determined by comparing the ROI with the cost of capital. The 
STB determines the cost of capital for each year and determines which Class I railroads are revenue 
adequate. The STB used a simple discounted cash flow (DCF) method to determine the industry’s 
weighted average cost of capital through 2005. After shippers requested public hearings to examine 
the methodology, the STB then changed to a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for the years 2006 
and 2007.  After another public hearing, STB decided to use a simple average of CAPM and a multi-
stage discounted cash flow model (MSDCF) in 2008 and beyond. 
Since the Staggers Act, the ROI for the railroad industry has increased from an average of 2.5% 
during the 1970s to an average of 10.25% from 2006 through 2008 (AAR, Railroad Facts).
Based upon the CAPM methodology, Figure 12 shows that the Class I railroads have been 
revenue adequate during 2005 and 2006 and nearly revenue adequate for the other years since 
2002.  In contrast, the Christensen (2008) study, which used return on equity, found that the Class I 
railroads could be considered revenue adequate since 2001.





































DCF CAPM ROI CAPM + MSDCF
Sources:  AAR Railroad Facts; Surface Transportation Board
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Financial Measures of Railroad Profitability
Whether measured by commonly used financial measures or by STB-determined revenue adequacy 
standards, the profitability of the railroad industry has improved considerably since deregulation. 
The Christensen (2008) study used various measures of profitability to compare the railroad industry 
with other industries and with the Standard & Poor’s 500.  Since 2004, railroad profitability was 
found to be comparable to that of most other industries (Christensen 2008).  
The rapid increase in rail rates since 2004 contributed to the surge in railroad profitability at that 
time. The increase in rail rates is the result of aggressive pricing as rail capacity constraints appeared 
and the over-recovery of fuel costs.  The higher rail rates also reflect higher rail costs since 2004 
(Figure 13).   
Railroad financial measures of profitability increased at a moderate rate through 2004, and 
then surged from 2005 through 2007.  Net income, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), 
and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) are commonly used 
financial measures of profitability. Net income, EBIT, and EBITDA changed 2%, -5%, and 5%, 
respectively, over the six-year period from 1998 to 2004. Over the four-year period from 2004 to 
2008, net profit, EBIT, and EBITDA increased 183%, 152%, and 102%, respectively.
Factors Affecting Railroad Industry Costs
Several factors affecting railroad costs are often overlooked when analyzing those costs.  Railroad 
management decisions affect some of these factors, which include merger premiums, size of 
operation, traffic density, the amount invested in capacity, and successful integration of operations 
during mergers.  Other factors, such as unusually high fuel costs and extreme weather events, are 
factors that railroad management are unable to control.   
As discussed in an earlier section, merger premiums can add substantially to the average fixed 
and variable costs6 of the new railroad firm. The effects of these mergers, including increased 
costs due to merger implementation difficulties, are visible in Figure 14, showing average railroad 
industry costs.  Variable costs for the railroad industry increased from 1997 through 2000 and fixed 
costs increased from 1995 through 1997.   


















Net income EBIT EBITDA
Sources:  AAR, Analysis of Class I Railroads
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Variable and total costs for the merged railroads increased after each of these major rail mergers 
or acquisitions:  
•	 The merger of the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe with the Burlington Northern 
(September 1995)
•	 The Union Pacific with the Southern Pacific (implemented December 1996)
•	 The split of Conrail between CSXT and Norfolk Southern (June 1999) 
In each of these mergers, the railroads had difficulties merging operating systems and lines, 
resulting in congestion that drove up average total and variable costs for the merging railroads. 
A recent study of railroad cost curves concluded that the four largest Class I railroads, BNSF, 
CSXT, NS, and UP, may have surpassed the optimal size of operation and may be experiencing 
diseconomies of scale (Bereskin 2008).  This means that the average costs for those railroads are 
higher than they would be if the firms were smaller.  Based upon 2005 data, the optimal size of a 
railroad was estimated to be slightly less than 21,000 route miles.  BNSF and UP operate more than 
32,000 route miles, while CSXT and NS operate more than 21,000 route miles.  The three smaller 
Class I railroads, Kansas City Southern, Canadian National, and Canadian Pacific, all appear to be 
operating with constant or increasing returns to scale.  
Excess traffic density on the railroad also affects railroad average costs by slowing train speeds 
and increasing terminal dwell times.  The slower train speeds and reduced terminal efficiency further 
reduce the effective capacity of the railroad, compounding the problem.  When a railroad has excess 
capacity, fixed costs are higher than necessary.  As railroads near capacity and capacity constraints 
appear, variable costs increase. The effects of railroad capacity constraints, beginning in 2005, are 
also visible in the above figure, which shows average railroad industry costs.
Another factor affecting average railroad fixed and variable costs is the amount the railroad 
industry invests in rail capacity. From 2004 through 2006, the railroad industry invested heavily 
Figure 14: Railroad Industry Average Cost, Variable Cost, and Fixed Cost in Dollars 
 Per  Ton-mile (adjusted for inflation in 2000 dollars)
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in capacity, which is shown in the average cost data in Figure 14 as increased fixed costs for the 
industry after 2004. As capacity bottlenecks are removed, however, variable costs should be reduced 
by these investments.
Unusually high fuel costs occurred from 2004, peaking in September of 2008. Fuel is a major 
component of railroad costs, so high fuel costs result in increased operating costs.  This can be seen 
in the figure above, where high fuel costs and capacity constraints resulted in increasing variable 
costs in 2005 and 2006.
Extreme weather events can also increase railroad industry costs by adding the costs of repair 
and rerouting traffic.  For instance, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in substantial damage to the 
rail network in Louisiana and Mississippi.  Damages to the CSX coastal line, which had the most 
damage, required nearly $250 million to repair (CSX Transportation 2006).  Likewise, a massive 
mudslide on the UP line between Klamath Falls and Eugene, OR, swept track, ties, and ballast 
halfway down the mountain and buried over 3,000 feet of mainline track in 20 feet of mud, snow, 
and downed trees (Union Pacific Railroad 2008).
Railroad Industry Revenue Compared to Marginal Costs 
Railroad industry revenue per ton-mile decreased slowly through 1996, rose slowly through 2004, 
and then increased rapidly in 2005 and 2006.  Marginal costs (i.e., the addition to total cost attributable 
to the addition of one ton-mile) increased in 2005 and 2006, probably due to rail congestion as 
capacity constraints in the rail network and higher fuel costs drove marginal costs up (see Figure 
15).  Average revenue increased more rapidly than marginal costs in 2005 and 2006, indicating 
aggressive pricing due to capacity constraints and over recovery of fuel costs. 
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SUMMARY
In both the short and long run, farmers cannot individually raise the prices of their commodities to 
reflect rising costs, so any increase in costs reduces their individual profit. Agricultural producers 
are unique in that they bear the transportation costs when grain is transported; in the short run the 
price the producer receives from the elevator is net of transportation costs.  Consequently, increases 
in transportation costs result in decreased producer profit.  
Rail rates need to be sufficient to provide railroads with sufficient profit to maintain their 
equipment and lines, provide reliable service, invest in needed capacity, and provide a reasonable 
return on investment.  However, unnecessarily high rail rates can damage the economic health of 
the farming sector and rural communities, and also make it more difficult for America to compete 
in export markets.  
The costs of rail transportation to market are important to agricultural producers because 
they represent a significant percentage of the average on-farm price; grain and oilseeds are bulk 
commodities with a low value in proportion to their weight.  Average rail tariff rates as a percent of 
the farm price of wheat have varied from 11.3% in 2007, when wheat prices were high, to 23.1% in 
1999, when wheat prices were low.
Agricultural producers have become more concerned with rail rates as rail mergers and line 
abandonments after implementation of the Staggers Act, with its limited regulation of rates, have 
led to less intramodal competition.  
This study reported an increase in the percentage of tons moving at R/VC greater than 300% 
that began in 1999, peaked in 2002, and decreased until 2007.  In Iowa, Montana, and North Dakota, 
however, a much greater percentage of grain and oilseed tonnage moved at R/VC ratios greater than 
300%.  The high percentage of rail rates exceeding an R/VC of 300% for Montana shippers from 
1998 through 2004 could be due to its distance from intermodal competition and the fact that one 
railroad handles 95% of the rail movements of grain.
Not only are rail rates for agricultural products higher than those for other commodities, but the 
rates have increased more rapidly from 2004 to 2008. Rail rates for grain and oilseeds increased to 
$2,809 per carload in 2008, up 73% from 2003; rates for all other commodities increased to $1,556 
per carload, up 50%.
Railroad rate structures favor large movements due to cost and operational efficiencies. There is 
a significant rate advantage for the largest trainload shipments of grain and oilseeds. Rates are 30% 
lower for shipments of more than 50 cars; rates for large shipments are about 2.1 cents per ton-mile, 
contrasted to about 3.0 cents for smaller movements.  The rates for larger sized shipments have 
increased relatively more than for smaller shipments over the entire period, thus, factors other than 
cost efficiencies may be driving the rate changes.
Rates for long hauls have a similar structure; movements less than 500 miles are about twice the 
rates for movements over 751 miles, 4.6 cents versus 2.15 cents per ton-mile in 2007. As railroads 
seek to increase the usage and revenue generation of their rolling stock, it is often in their best 
interest to give price/rate incentives to shippers with long hauls. Also, the cost disadvantages in 
equipment utilization make the short hauls more expensive for the carriers.
Shippers bear increasing responsibility for car supply and other functions historically provided 
by the railroads. The costs of railcar ownership have shifted from railroads to shippers, adding 
further to costs not reflected in tariff rates. Private ownership has been the source of new covered 
hopper railcar capacity; by 2008, hopper car ownership was 70% private, 26% Class I railroad, and 
4% smaller railroads. From 1981 to 2008, privately owned cars increased from 128,394 to 290,176, 
or 126%, as Class I railroads decreased their ownership by 37%.  
Fuel surcharges should reimburse railroads for only the incremental increase in fuel costs, not 
the base fuel costs that are already included in the rate.  The average growth in fuel surcharge per 
grain carload during the 3rd quarter of 2008 was $650.77, contrasted to the growth in railroad fuel 
costs of $286.46, a difference of 127% over the incremental increase in the cost of fuel.  Furthermore, 
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as fuel costs increase, the difference between the quarterly growth in grain fuel surcharges and the 
growth in railroad fuel costs tends to increase.  
This study also reports that billions of dollars in premiums paid as part of mergers are included 
in the determination of railroad revenue adequacy, which is likely to result in higher rail rates for 
shippers than otherwise would be the case.
Rail rates have increased rapidly since 2004, resulting in a surge of railroad profitability.  The 
increase in rail rates is the result of aggressive pricing as rail capacity constraints appeared, and the 
over-recovery of fuel costs.  The higher rail rates also reflect higher rail costs since 2004.
Railroad financial measures of profitability increased at a moderate rate through 2004, and 
then surged from 2005 through 2007. Net income, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), and 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) are commonly used 
financial measures of profitability. Over the four-year period from 2004 to 2008, net profit, EBIT, 
and EBITDA increased 183%, 152%, and 102%, respectively.
Endnotes
1. Running directionally occurs when two railroads with parallel rail lines share rail lines, allowing 
shared use of one line in each direction.  This practice eliminates trains waiting on sidings for 
trains moving in the opposite direction to pass.
2. Tariff shipments comprise approximately 75% by weight of the grain and oilseed movements 
while contract shipments comprise approximately 25%.
3. Some movements have enough competition to limit rail rates and are exempt from regulation. 
Exemption of particular movements or exempt commodities can be appealed before the STB, 
and the STB may remove the exemption if competition no longer adequately constrains rates.
4. A merger premium is the amount paid for a firm that exceeds its net book value according 
to historical accounting methods.  Net book value is the historical cost less accumulated 
depreciation.
5. As railroad tariff rates are partially deregulated and the financial condition of the railroad 
industry in 1980 was poor, the Staggers Act requires the regulatory agency (STB) to evaluate 
the revenue adequacy of the major U.S. railroads and the railroad industry.  The STB calculates 
the cost of capital (weighted average of the cost of debt and cost of capital) for the railroad 
industry annually.  If the railroad’s return on net investment exceeds the cost of capital, the 
carrier is judged revenue adequate, which means that the railroad is able to attract sufficient 
capital.   
6. Merger premiums add to variable costs when the premiums are paid on assets included in the 
calculation of variable costs.
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